# Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing

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## ABSTRACT

During the COVID-19 pandemic, fair and efficient rationing of healthcare resources has emerged as an important issue that has been discussed by medical experts, policy-makers, and the general public. We consider a healthcare rationing problem where medical units are to be allocated to patients. Each unit is reserved for one of several categories and the patients have different priorities for the categories. We present an allocation rule that respects the priorities, complies with the eligibility requirements, allocates the largest feasible number of units, and does not incentivize agents to hide that they qualify through a category. Moreover, the rule is polynomial-time computable. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first known rule with the aforementioned properties.

## KEYWORDS

Matching, allocation under priorities, healthcare rationing, assignment maximization

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as one of the biggest challenges the world has faced. It has resulted in a frantic scientific race to produce the most effective and safe vaccine to stem the devastating effects of the pandemic. Whereas there is encouraging initial news on the creation of vaccines, there are still several scientific challenges on how to distribute, allocate, and administer them in an efficient and fair manner.

Since healthcare resources such as ventilators, antiviral treatments, and vaccines can be scarce or costly, a fundamental question that arises is who to prioritize when making allocation decisions. For example, three important priority groups that are highlighted by medical practitioners and policy-makers are (1) health care workers; (2) other essential workers and people in high-transmission settings; (3) and people with medical vulnerabilities associated with poorer COVID-19 outcomes [39, 45]. Other concerns that have been discussed include racial equity [16].

When healthcare resources need to be allocated, it is not enough to identify priority groups. There is also a need to algorithmically and transparently make these prioritized allocations decisions [22, 46]. In a New York Times article, the issue has been referred to as the one of the hardest decisions, health organizations need to make [23]. Since the decisions need to be justified to the public, they must be aligned with the ethical guidelines such as respecting priorities of various categories. These decisions are not straightforward, especially when a patient is eligible for more than one category. When patients are eligible for multiple categories, the decision on which category is used can have compounding effects on what categories other agents can use. A fundamental question that arises is the following one:

> *How do we allocate scarce medical resources fairly and efficiently while taking into account various ethical principles and priority groups?*

The question is not just fundamental but the solution to the problem is time–critical as various states, city councils, and municipalities start to roll out vaccines using their particular ethical guidelines. The problem of health care rationing has recently been formally studied by market designers. Pathak et al. [38] were among the first to frame the problem as a two-sided matching problem in which patients are on one side and the resources units are on the other side. By doing so, they linked the healthcare rationing problem with the rich field of two-sided matching [41].

Pathak et al. suggested dividing the units into different reserve categories, each with its own priority ranking of the patients. The categories and the category-specific priorities represent the ethical principles and guidelines that a policy-maker may wish to implement.[1] For example, a category for senior people may have an age-specific priority ranking that puts the eldest citizens first. Having a holistic framework that considers different types of priorities has been termed important in healthcare rationing.[2] The approach of Pathak et al. has been recommended or adopted by various organizations including the NASEM (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine) Framework for Equitable Vaccine Allocation [37] and has been endorsed in medical circles [39, 43]. The approach has been covered widely in the media, including the New York Times and the Washington Post.[3]

For their two-sided matching formulation, Pathak et al. [38] proposed a solution for the problem. One of their key insights was that running the Deferred Acceptance algorithm [24, 40] on the underlying problem satisfies basic relevant axioms (eligibility compliance, respect of priorities, and non-wastefulness). They also showed when all the category priorities are consistent with a global baseline priority, then there is a smart reserves algorithm that computes a maximum size matching satisfying the basic axioms. The smart reserves approach makes careful decisions about which category should be availed by which patient. However, the problem of such a smart reserves approach for the general problem with general *heterogeneous* priorities has not been addressed in the literature. In this paper, we set out to address this issue and answer the following research problem.

[1] See for example, the book by Bognar and Hirose [14] on the ethics of healthcare rationing that discusses many of these principles.

[2] In a report issued by the Deeble Institute for Health Policy Research, Martin [36] writes that "To establish robust healthcare rationing in Australia, decision-makers need to acknowledge the various implicit and explicit priorities that influence the process and develop a decision-making tool that incorporates them."

[3] https://www.covid19reservesystem.org/media

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*For the general healthcare rationing problem with heterogeneous priorities, how do we allocate resources in a fair, economically efficient, strategyproof, and computationally tractable way?*

*Contribution.* For the general healthcare rationing problem, we first highlight that naively ascribing strict preferences over the categories to the agents can have adverse effects on the efficiency of the outcome when patients are eligible for multiple categories. If the eligibility requirements are treated as hard constraints, it leads to inefficient allocation of resources. If the eligibility requirements are treated as soft constraints, then the outcome does not allocate the resources optimally to the highest priority patients, thereby undermining important healthcare guidelines and ethical principles.

We address the problem posed by Pathak et al. [38], that of finding a maximum beneficiary assignment that respects priorities and other desirable axioms. Our main contribution is presenting an allocation rule that

(1) complies with the eligibility requirements,
(2) respects the priorities of the categories (for each category, patients of higher priority are served first),
(3) is non-wasteful (there is no unit that is unused but could be used by some eligible patient),
(4) yields a maximal beneficiary allocation (allocates the largest feasible number of units to patients who are eligible for the categories pertaining to the units),
(5) is strategyproof (does not incentivize agents to under-report the categories they qualify for) if the priorities are strict,
(6) is monotonic in the quotas (selected agents remain selected if the category quotas weakly increase), and
(7) is strongly polynomial-time computable.

Our algorithm also immediately applies to the school choice problem in which students are only interested in being matched with one of their acceptable schools. It also applies to hiring settings in which applicants are interested in one of the positions and each of the departments has its own priorities. Finally, it applies to many other rationing scenarios such as allocation of limited slots at public events or visas to immigration applicants.

## 2 RELATED WORK

The paper is related to an active area of research on matching with distributional constraints [see, e.g., 32]. One general class of distributional constraints that have been examined in matching market design pertains to common quotas over institutions such as hospitals [12, 26, 30, 31].

Within the umbrella of work on matching with distributional constraints, particularly relevant to healthcare rationing is the literature on school choice with diversity constraints [8, 9, 11, 18–21, 25, 28, 35]. Categories in healthcare rationing correspond to affirmative action types in school choice. For a brief survey, we suggest the book chapter by Heo [29]. Except for the special case in which students have exactly one type [21], most of the approaches do not achieve diversity goals optimally whereas in the healthcare rationing problem that we focus on, our goal is to find matchings that are maximal in terms of beneficiary assignment. Ahmed et al. [6], Dickerson et al. [17], and Ahmadi et al. [5] consider optimization approaches for diverse matchings but their objective and models are different.

Pathak et al. [38] were the first to frame a rationing problem with category priorities as a two-sided matching problem in which agents are simply interested in a unit of resource and the resources are reserved for different categories. They show that artificially enforcing strict preferences of the agents over the categories and running the deferred acceptance algorithm results in desirable outcomes for the rationing problem. They note, however, that this approach may lead to matchings that are not Pareto optimal. They then proposed to use the smart reserves approach of Sönmez and Yenmez [44] for the restricted problem when all the preferential categories have consistent priorities. Our results can be viewed as simultaneously achieving the key properties of the two approaches of Pathak et al.. Firstly, we propose a new algorithm that achieves the same key properties for heterogeneous priorities as the smart reserves algorithm of Sönmez and Yenmez [44] and Pathak et al. [38] for homogeneous priorities. Secondly, our algorithm has an important advantage over the Deferred Acceptance formulation of Pathak et al. [38] for the case of heterogeneous priorities as our approach additionally achieves the important property of maximality in beneficiary assignment. In followup work, Grigoryan [27] considers optimization approaches for variants of the problem but does not present any polynomial-time algorithm or consider incentive issues. In contrast to the papers on healthcare rationing discussed above, we also consider strategyproofness and monotonicity aspects and show that our rule complies with them.

In this paper, we attempt to compute what are essentially maximum size stable matchings. The problem of computing such matchings is NP-hard if both sides have strict preferences/priorities [13]. In our problem, the agents essentially have dichotomous preferences (categories they are/are not eligible for) and, hence, we are able to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem.

Furthermore, our algorithm is strategyproof if the priorities are strict. In contrast, for other two-sided matching settings, it is known that maximizing the number of matched individuals results in incentive and fairness impossibilities [see, e.g., 4, 33]. Computing outcomes that match as many agents as possible, has also been examined in related but different contexts [see, e.g., 3, 7, 10, 15].

## 3 MODEL

We adopt the essential features of the healthcare rationing model of Pathak et al. [38] with one generalization: we allow the categories' priorities over agents to be weak rather than strict. There are $q$ identical and indivisible units of some resource, which are to be allocated to the agents in a set $N$ with $|N| = n$. Each category $c$ has a quota $q_c \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\sum_{c \in C} q_c = q$ and a priority ranking $\succsim_c$, which is a preorder on $N \cup \{\emptyset\}$. An agent $i$ is eligible for category $c$ if $i \succ_c \emptyset$. We say that $I = (N, C, (\succsim_c), (q_c))$ is an instance (of the rationing problem). (For convenience, we will write $(\succsim_c)$ and $(q_c)$ for the profile of priorities and quotas in the sequel.)

A matching $\mu\colon N \to C \cup \{\emptyset\}$ is a function that maps each agent to a category or to $\emptyset$ and satisfies the capacity constraints: for each $c \in C$, $|\mu^{-1}(c)| \leq q_c$. For an agent $i \in N$, $\mu(i) = \emptyset$ means that $i$ is unmatched (that is, does not receive any unit) and $\mu(i) = c$ means

that $i$ receives a unit reserved for category $c$. When convenient, we will identify a matching $\mu$ with the set of agent-category pairs $\{\{i, \mu(i)\} : \mu(i) \neq \emptyset\}$.[4]

We introduce four axioms that are natural in the context of allocating medical units and well-grounded in practice. For further motivation of these axioms, we recommend the detailed discussions by Pathak et al. [38].

The first axiom we consider requires that matchings comply with eligibility requirements. It specifies that a patient should only take a unit of a category for which the patient is eligible. For example, a young person should not take a unit from the units reserved for elderly people.

*Definition 3.1 (Compliance with eligibility requirements).* A matching $\mu$ *complies with eligibility requirements* if for any $i \in N$ and $c \in C$, $\mu(i) = c \implies i \succ_c \emptyset$.

The second axiom concerns the respect of priorities of categories. It rules out that a patient is matched to a unit of some category $c$ while some other agent with a higher priority for $c$ is unmatched.

*Definition 3.2 (Respect of priorities).* A matching $\mu$ *respects priorities* if for any $i, j \in N$ and $c \in C$, $\mu(i) = c$ and $\mu(j) = \emptyset \implies j \not\succ_c i$.

An astute reader who is familiar with the theory of stable matchings will immediately realize that the axiom "respect of priorities" is equivalent to *justified envy-freeness* in the context of school-choice matchings [2].

Next, non-wastefulness requires that if an agent is unmatched despite being eligible for a category, then all units reserved for that category are matched to other agents.

*Definition 3.3 (Non-wastefulness).* A matching $\mu$ is *non-wasteful* if for any $i \in N$ and $c \in C$, $i \succ_c \emptyset$ and $\mu(i) = \emptyset \implies |\mu^{-1}(c)| = q_c$.

Not all non-wasteful matchings allocate the same number of units. In particular, some may not allocate as many units as possible. A stronger efficiency notion prescribes that the number of allocated units is maximal subject to compliance with the eligibility requirements.

*Definition 3.4 (Maximal beneficiary assignment).* A matching $\mu$ is a *maximal beneficiary assignment* if it has maximum size among all matchings complying with eligibility requirements.

These four axioms capture the first guideline put forth in the report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: "ensure that allocation maximizes benefit to patients, mitigates inequities and disparities, and adheres to ethical principles" [37, page 69]

The following example illustrates the definitions above.

*Example 3.5.* Suppose there are three agents and two categories with one reserved unit each.

$$N = \{1, 2, 3\}, \quad C = \{c_1, c_2\}, \quad q_{c_1} = 1, q_{c_2} = 1.$$

The priority ranking of $c_1$ is $2 \succ_{c_1} 3 \succ_{c_1} \emptyset \succ_{c_1} 1$ and the priority ranking of $c_2$ is $2 \succ_{c_2} \emptyset \succ_{c_2} 1 \succ_{c_2} 3$. Figure 1 illustrates this instance of the rationing problem.

[4]In graph theoretic terms, $\mu$ is a $b$-matching because multiple edges in $\mu$ can be adjacent to a category $c$.




**Figure 1: The problem instance described in Example 3.5. A dotted line between an agent and a category indicates that the agent is eligible for the category.**

Note that agent 1 is not eligible for any category, agent 2 is eligible for $c_1$ and $c_2$, and agent 3 is eligible only for $c_1$. Thus, the following matchings comply with the eligibility requirements.

$$\mu_1 = \emptyset \qquad \mu_2 = \{\{2, c_1\}\} \qquad \mu_3 = \{\{2, c_2\}\}$$
$$\mu_4 = \{\{3, c_1\}\} \qquad \mu_5 = \{\{2, c_2\}, \{3, c_1\}\}$$

All of these matchings except for $\mu_4$ respect priorities. Only $\mu_2$ and $\mu_5$ are non-wasteful. The only matching that is a maximal beneficiary assignment is $\mu_5$.

We are interested in allocation rules, which, for each instance, return a matching.

*Definition 3.6 (Allocation rule).* An allocation rule maps every instance $I$ to a matching for $I$.

We say that an allocation rule $f$ satisfies one of the axioms in Definitions 3.1 to 3.4 if $f(I)$ satisfies the axiom for all instances $I$. Moreover, we define a notion of strategyproofness for allocation rules. Note that all units are identical and agents have no preferences over the category of the unit they receive However, they may have an incentive to hide being eligible for a category, or, more generally, to aim for a lower priority for some category.[5]

Formalizing strategyproofness requires the following definition. Let $(\succsim_c)$ and $(\succsim'_c)$ be priority profiles and $i \in N$. We say agent $i$'s priority decreases from $(\succsim_c)$ to $(\succsim'_c)$ if for all $j, k \neq i$ and $c \in C$,

$$j \succsim_c k \longleftrightarrow j \succsim'_c k$$
$$j \succsim_c i \longrightarrow j \succsim'_c i \text{ and } j \succ_c i \longrightarrow j \succ'_c i$$

That is, the priority rankings over agents other than $i$ are the same in both profiles and $i$ can only move down in the priority rankings from $(\succsim_c)$ to $(\succsim'_c)$. We also say that $i$'s priority decreases from $I = (N, C, (\succsim_c), (q_c))$ to $I' = (N, C, (\succsim'_c), (q_c))$. Strategyproofness requires that if $i$ is unmatched for $I$, then $i$ is also unmatched for $I'$.

[5]In the context of school choice, lowering oneself in the priority ranking of a school is akin to students deliberately underperforming in an entrance exam.

*Definition 3.7 (Strategyproofness).* An allocation rule $f$ is strategyproof if $f(I)(i) = \emptyset$ implies $f(I')(i) = \emptyset$ whenever $i$'s priority decreases from $I$ to $I'$.

In particular, with a strategyproof allocation rule, agents cannot benefit from hiding that they are eligible for a category.[6]

Finally, we define a monotonicity axiom that requires that matched agents remain matched if the categories' quotas weakly increase.

*Definition 3.8 (Monotonicity in quotas).* An allocation rule $f$ is monotonic in quotas if for any two instances $I$ and $I'$ with quotas $(q_c)$ and $(q'_c)$ so that $q_c \leq q'_c$ for all $c \in C$, every agent who is matched in $f(I)$ is also matched in $f(I')$.

## 4 ISSUES WITH BREAKING TIES AND APPLYING DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE

The approach of Pathak et al. (2020) is to frame the healthcare rationing problem as a two-sided matching problem. They showed that if one artificially introduces (strict) preferences for the agents over the categories they are eligible for and applies the Deferred Acceptance algorithm, the resulting matching complies with the eligibility requirements, respects priorities, and is non-wasteful [38, Theorem 2]. They state the algorithmic implications of their result.

> *"Not only is this result a second characterization of matchings that satisfy our three basic axioms, it also provides a concrete procedure to calculate all such matchings."*

Although considering all possible artificial preferences and running Deferred Acceptance gives us all the matchings satisfying the three axioms, it is computationally expensive to consider $|C|!^{|N|}$ different preference profiles.

Not every preference profile leads to a compelling outcome even if the categories have strict priorities. For example, many preference profiles lead to matchings that are not maximal beneficiary assignments. The next example highlights this issue. [7]

*Example 4.1.* Consider the instance in Example 3.5. Suppose we run the Deferred Acceptance algorithm assuming all agents prefer $c_1$ to $c_2$ to $c_3$. Assuming agents can only be matched to categories they are eligible for (compliance with eligibility requirements), the resulting matching is $\mu_2 = \{\{2, c_1\}\}$. This matching is however not the most efficient use of the resources because it is possible to allocate all units while still satisfying the axioms in Definitions 3.1 to 3.3: $\mu_5 = \{\{3, c_1\}, \{2, c_2\}\}$.

Hence, artificially inducing preferences of agents and running Deferred Acceptance can lead to inefficient allocations. Even if we ignore computational concerns and can assign preferences to agents so that the matching selected by Deferred Acceptance is of maximum size and respects priorities, it is not clear whether such a rule satisfies strategyproofness and monotonicity properties like the ones we introduced above. We propose a rule that circumvents both issues.

[6] This restricted version of strategyproofness under which agents do not have an incentive to hide their eligible categories, has been referred to as incentive-compatibility by Aygün and Bó [8].

[7] The issue is also evident from the discussion by Pathak et al. [38] where they point out that sequential treatment of categories may not give a maximal beneficiary assignment.




**Figure 2: The reservation graph $G_I^\pi$ for the instance $I$ in Example 3.5. The dotted lines correspond to edges in $E$. The numbers close to the edges are their weights according to $w$.**

## 5 THE ALLOCATION RULE

Our allocation rule is based on an arbitrary permutation $\pi$ of the agents called a baseline ordering. The baseline ordering could be based on some global scale that measures the need for treatment. For an agent $i$, $\pi(i)$ is interpreted as the position of $i$ in the baseline ordering. Given an instance $I = (N, C, (\succsim_c), (q_c))$, we construct the corresponding *reservation graph* $G_I^\pi = (N \cup C, E, w, (q_c))$, which is a bipartite, weighted graph. The two independent vertex sets are $N$ and $C$ and the edge set $E$ consists of all agent-category pairs so that the agent is eligible for the category.

$$E = \{\{i, c\} : i \in N, c \in C, i \succ_c \emptyset\}$$

The weight of an edge $\{i, c\} \in E$ is

$$w(\{i, c\}) = 1 + w_c(\{i, c\}) + w_\pi(\{i, c\})$$

where

(1) $w_c(\{i, c\}) = (n - \ell)\epsilon$ if $i$ is in the $\ell$th most-preferred equivalence class in $c$'s priority ranking, and
(2) $w_\pi(\{i, c\}) = \frac{\epsilon}{2^{\pi(i)}}$,

for some $\epsilon < \frac{1}{n^2}$. The reservation graph for the instance in Example 3.5 is depicted in Figure 2 where the baseline ordering is chosen as 123.

We say that a subset of edges $M$ is a *matching* of $G_I^\pi$ if each $i \in N$ is adjacent to at most one edge in $M$ and each $c \in C$ is adjacent to at most $q_c$ edges in $M$. Hence, each matching $\mu$ of $I$ induces a matching $M_\mu = \{\{i, c\} \in E \colon \mu(i) = c\}$ of $G_I^\pi$ and vice versa. We will not distinguish between $\mu$ and $M_\mu$ in the sequel.

The intuition behind the edge weights is as follows. We want to find a maximum size matching of $G_I^\pi$. Among the maximum size matchings, we want to restrict attention to those that respect priorities. Finally, among the latter set of matchings, we want to prioritize the agents who are ranked early in the baseline ordering $\pi$ (to achieve strategyproofness and monotonicity). This can be done as follows. We first care about whether a category finds an agent acceptable, in which case there is an edge with weight at least

1. Secondly, we give additional weight if an agent is high in the priority ranking of the category. Finally, matching agents who come early in the baseline ordering gives more weight than matching agents who come late. By the choice of $\epsilon$, the weight a matching can obtain through $w_c$ and $w_\pi$ is always less than 1. Hence, ordering matchings by weight refines the order induced by size. Similarly, $w_\pi$ is chosen so that the sum of weights a matching can get through $w_\pi$ is less than $\epsilon$ (which is smallest possible non-zero difference in the weight of any two matchings according to $w_c$). Thus, matching agents to categories for which they have high priority is prioritized over matching agents who come early in the baseline ordering.

Consider an allocation rule that chooses a maximal weight matching of $G_I^\pi$ for every instance $I$ (with $\pi$ fixed). The following three lemmas show that any such allocation rule satisfies *all* of the axioms defined above. By construction of the reservation graph, each maximal weight matching complies with the eligibility requirements, is a maximum size matching, and respects priorities. We verify these facts in Lemma 5.1. Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 show that the above allocation rules are strategyproof (if priorities are strict) and monotonic, with the former taking up the bulk of the work.

Lemma 5.1. *Every maximal weight matching of $G_I^\pi$*

*(1) complies with acceptability requirements,*
*(2) is of maximum size among feasible matchings,*
*(3) respects priorities, and*
*(4) matches the same set of agents.*

Proof. Let $\mu$ be a maximal weight matching of $G_I^\pi$.

(1) If $\{i, c\}$ is an edge in $G_I^\pi$, then $i \succ_c \emptyset$. Hence, any matching of $G_I^\pi$ complies with the acceptability requirements. In particular, $\mu$ does.

(2) For any edge $e \in E$,

$$w(e) \leq 1 + (n-1)\epsilon + \frac{\epsilon}{2} < 1 + \frac{1}{n}$$

since $\epsilon < \frac{1}{n^2}$ (recall the definition of $w_c$ and $w_\pi$). Hence, $w(e) \in [1, 1 + \frac{1}{n})$. Moreover, every matching $\mu'$ of $G_I^\pi$ has cardinality at most $n$ as $|\mu'| \leq n = |N|$ since every agent can be matched to at most one category. Hence, $w(\mu') = \sum_{e \in \mu'} w(e) \in [|\mu'|, |\mu'| + 1)$. So $w(\mu) \geq w(\mu')$ implies $|\mu| \geq |\mu'|$. Hence, $\mu$ is a maximal size matching (and, thus, also non-wasteful).

(3) If $\mu$ does not respect priorities, there exist $i, j \in N$ and $c \in C$ so that $\mu(i) = c$, $\mu(j) = \emptyset$, and $j \succ_c i$. In particular, $l_j \leq l_i - 1$, where $l_j$ is the rank of $j$'s equivalence class in the priority ranking of $c$ (and similarly for $i$). Then

$$\begin{aligned} w(\{j, c\}) &= 1 + (n - l_j)\epsilon + \frac{\epsilon}{2^{\pi(j)}} \\ &> 1 + (n - l_j - 1)\epsilon + \epsilon \\ &\geq 1 + (n - l_i)\epsilon + \frac{\epsilon}{2^{\pi(i)}} = w(\{i, c\}) \end{aligned}$$

It follows that $\mu' = \mu - (\{\{i, c\}\} \cup \{\{j, c\}\}$ is a matching of $G_I^\pi$ with $w(\mu') > w(\mu)$. Since this contradicts that $\mu$ has maximal weight, $\mu$ has to respect priorities.

(4) We show that, more generally, any two matchings $\mu$ and $\mu'$ of $G_I^\pi$ with $w(\mu) = w(\mu')$ match the same set of agents. In the proof of (2), we have observed that $w(\mu) \in [|\mu|, |\mu| + 1)$ and $w(\mu') \in [|\mu'|, |\mu'| + 1)$. So the fact that $w(\mu) = w(\mu')$ implies $|\mu| = |\mu'|$. Recalling that $w(\mu) = |\mu| + w_c(\mu) + w_\pi(\mu)$ (and similarly for $\mu'$) gives

$$w_c(\mu) + w_\pi(\mu) = w_c(\mu') + w_\pi(\mu') \tag{1}$$

Now $w_c(\mu)$ and $w_c(\mu')$ are integer multiples of $\epsilon$ and $w_\pi(\mu) < \epsilon$ and $w_\pi(\mu') < \epsilon$. It follows from (1) that

$$w_\pi(\mu) = w_\pi(\mu') \tag{2}$$

Inserting the definition of $w_\pi$ gives

$$\sum_{\{i,c\} \in \mu} \frac{\epsilon}{2^{\pi(i)}} = \sum_{\{i,c\} \in \mu'} \frac{\epsilon}{2^{\pi(i)}}$$

This equality holds if and only if $\{i \in N \colon \mu(i) \in C\} = \{i \in N \colon \mu'(i) \in C\}$. That is, if $\mu$ and $\mu'$ match the same set of agents. □

The proof of Lemma 5.2 will use some graph-theoretical terminology. Let $a_0, \ldots, a_m$ be a sequence of vertices in $G_I^\pi$. If $P = \{\{a_{l-1}, a_l\} \colon l \in \{1, \ldots, m\}\} \subset E$, we call $P$ a path in $G_I^\pi$. The length of $P$ is $|P|$ and $a_0$ and $a_m$ are the initial and terminal vertex of $P$. If $\mu$ is a matching of $G_I^\pi$, $P$ is an *alternating path* for $\mu$ if $\{a_{i-1}, a_i\} \in \mu$ if and only if $i$ is even and either $a_0 \in N$ and $a_0$ is unmatched in $\mu$ or $a_0 \in C$ and $|\mu^{-1}(a_0)| < q_c$. If, moreover, $\sum_{e \in P \setminus \mu} w(e) > \sum_{e \in P \cap \mu} w(e)$, $P$ is an *augmenting path* for $\mu$ in $G_I^\pi$.

Lemma 5.2. *Let $i \in N$ and $I$ and $I'$ be instances with strict priorities so that $i$'s priority decreases from $I$ to $I'$. If $i$ is unmatched in* some *maximal weight matching of $G_I^\pi$, then $i$ is unmatched in* all *maximal weight matchings of $G_{I'}^\pi$.*

Proof. Let $G_I^\pi = (N \cup C, E, w, (q_c))$ and $G_{I'}^\pi = (N \cup C, E', w', (q_c))$. We make some simplifying assumptions first. It suffices to consider the case that $i$'s priority for only one category decreases from $I$ to $I'$. That is, there is $d \in C$ so that $\succsim_c = \succsim'_c$ for all $c \neq d$. Moreover, we may assume that there is exactly one agent $i'$ with $i \succ_d i'$ and $i' \succ'_d i$. Repeated application of these cases yield the general statement.

Let $\mu$ and $\mu'$ be maximal weight matchings of $G_I^\pi$ and $G_{I'}^\pi$, respectively. Assume for contradiction that $\mu(i) = \emptyset$ and $\mu'(i) \neq \emptyset$. Note that $\mu(i') \neq d$ since $i \succ_d i'$ and $\mu$ respects priorities by Lemma 5.1(3).

*Claim* 1. $\mu$ and $\mu'$ match the same number of agents ($|\mu| = |\mu'|$).

Proof. It follows from the definition of the reservation graph that either $E = E'$ (if $i \succ'_d \emptyset$) or $E = E' \cup \{\{i, d\}\}$ (if $\emptyset \succ_d i$). In particular, $E' \subset E$ so that $\mu'$ is also a matching of $G_I^\pi$. Since $\mu$ is a maximal weight matching of $G_I^\pi$, it follows from Lemma 5.1(2) that $\mu$ is a maximal size matching of $G_I^\pi$. Hence, $|\mu| \geq |\mu'|$. Similarly, since $\mu(i) = \emptyset$, $\mu$ is also a matching of $G_{I'}^\pi$. Since $\mu'$ is a maximal weight matching of $G_{I'}^\pi$, we conclude $|\mu'| \geq |\mu|$. Together, $|\mu| = |\mu'|$. □

Figure 3 depicts the situation we reason about in the remainder in the proof.

*Claim* 2. There is an augmenting path for $\mu$ in $G_{I'}^\pi$ that alternates between edges in $\mu'$ and edges in $\mu$ with initial vertex $i$ and an agent who is unmatched in $\mu'$ as terminal vertex. That is, there is a

path $P = P_{\mu'} \cup P_\mu$ with

$$P_{\mu'} = \{\{j_{s-1}, c_s\} : s \in \{1, \dots, n\}\} \subset \mu' - \mu$$
$$P_\mu = \{\{j_s, c_s\} : s \in \{1, \dots, n\}\} \subset \mu - \mu'$$
$$j_0 = i \text{ and } \mu'(j_n) = \emptyset$$
$$\text{the } j_s \text{ are pairwise distinct}$$
$$w'(P_{\mu'}) > w'(P_\mu)$$

Proof. Since $i$ is matched in $\mu'$ and unmatched in $\mu$ ($\mu'(i) \neq \emptyset$ and $\mu(i) = \emptyset$), there is a path $P = P_{\mu'} \cup P_\mu$ in $G_{I'}^\pi$ that alternates between edges in $\mu'$ and $\mu$ and starts at $i$. ($P_{\mu'} = \{i, \mu'(i)\}$ and $P_\mu = \emptyset$ is one such path.) Assume that $P$ is of maximal length among all such path starting at $i$. By Claim 1 and Lemma 5.1(2), $\mu$ is a maximal size matching of $G_{I'}^\pi$. Hence, $P$ has even length (otherwise alternating along $P$ would yield a matching of larger size than $\mu$, namely the matching $\mu - P_\mu \cup P_{\mu'}$). We conclude that $P$ is induced by a sequence $i = j_0, c_1, j_1, \dots, c_n, j_n$ with $\{j_{s-1}, c_s\} \in \mu'$ and $\{j_s, c_s\} \in \mu$ for all $s \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ for some $j_1, \dots, j_n \in N$ and $c_1, \dots, c_n \in C$. Since $P$ is of maximal length, it follows that $\mu'(j_n) = \emptyset$.

Now $P_\mu$ and $P_{\mu'}$ are matchings of $G_{I'}^\pi$. Since $i$ is unmatched in $P_\mu$ but is matched in $P_{\mu'}$, $P_\mu$ and $P_{\mu'}$ do not match the same set of agents. By the proof of Lemma 5.1(4), $w'(P_\mu) \neq w'(P_{\mu'})$. If $w'(P_\mu) > w'(P_{\mu'})$, then $P$ is an augmenting path for $\mu'$ in $G_{I'}^\pi$, so that $\mu' - P_{\mu'} \cup P_\mu$ is a matching with larger weight than $\mu'$. This contradicts that $\mu'$ is a maximal weight matching of $G_{I'}^\pi$. Hence, $w'(P_{\mu'}) > w'(P_\mu)$. □

We will in the following freely and without mentioning use the fact that

$$\sum_{e \in \mu} w_\pi(e) < \epsilon = w'_c(\{i', d\}) - w_c(\{i', d\})$$
$$= w'(\{i', d\}) - w(\{i', d\})$$

and similarly for $w'_\pi$.

*Claim* 3. $j_s = i'$ and $c_{s+1} = d$ for some $s \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$.

Proof. We have $w(\{j, c\}) = w'(\{j, c\})$ for all $j \in N$ and $c \neq d$. So if $c_s \neq d$ for all $s \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, then, by Claim 2, $P$ is an augmenting path for $\mu$ in $G_I^\pi$. Since this would contradict that $\mu$ is a maximal weight matching of $G_I^\pi$. Assume for contradiction that $s = 1$ and $c_u \neq d$ for all $u \in \{2, \dots, n\}$. Then,

$$w(P_{\mu'}) > w'(P_{\mu'}) \geq w'(P_\mu) = w(P_\mu)$$

where we use the assumption we seek to contradict and the fact that $i$'s priority for $d$ decreases from $I$ to $I'$ for the first inequality, the fact that $\mu' - P_{\mu'} \cup P_\mu$ is a matching for $G_{I'}^\pi$ and $\mu'$ is a maximal weight matching for $G_{I'}^\pi$ for the second inequality, and again the assumption we seek to contradict for the last equality. Since $\mu - P_\mu \cup P_{\mu'}$ is a matching for $G_I^\pi$, this contradicts that $\mu$ is a maximal weight matching for $G_I^\pi$. Hence, there is $u \in \{2, \dots, n\}$ with $c_u = d$. Using that $w(\{j_{u-1}, d\}) = w'(\{j_{u-1}, d\})$ if $j_{u-1} \neq i'$, we conclude that $j_{u-1} = i'$. □

Let $s$ as in Claim 3. Let $P^1$ the segment of $P$ from $i$ to $j_s = i'$ and $P^2$ the segment from $j_s$ to $j_n$. Lastly, let $P_\mu^u = P_\mu \cap P^u$ and $P_{\mu'}^u = P_{\mu'} \cap P^u$ for $u \in \{1, 2\}$. Note that

$$|P_\mu^u| = |P_{\mu'}^u| \tag{3}$$




**Figure 3: Augmenting path for $\mu$ in $G_{I'}^\pi$ alternating between edges in $\mu'$ (in red) and edges in $\mu$ (in blue). The dotted regions indicate the paths $P^1$ and $P^2$ defined after the proof of Claim 3. Thus, $j_s = i'$ and $c_{s+1} = d$.**

since both $P^u$ have even length (the initial and terminal vertex of each $P^u$ is an agent) and $P^u$ alternates between edges in $\mu'$ and $\mu$.

*Claim* 4. $w_c(P_{\mu'}^2 - \{\{i', d\}\} \cup \{\{i, d\}\}) = w_c(P_\mu^2)$ and $w'_c(P_{\mu'}^2) = w'_c(P_\mu^2)$.

Proof. We have the following sequence of (in)equalities, explained below.

$$w_c(P_{\mu'}^2 - \{\{i', d\}\} \cup \{\{i, d\}\}) = w'_c(P_{\mu'}^2) \geq w'_c(P_\mu^2) = w_c(P_\mu^2)$$

The first equality uses that $w_c(\{i, d\}) = w'_c(\{i', d\})$ and $w_c(\{j, c\}) = w'_c(\{j, c\})$ unless $\{j, c\} = \{i, d\}$ or $\{j, c\} = \{i', d\}$. The last equality also uses the latter fact. The inequality uses that $\mu' - P_{\mu'}^2 \cup P_\mu^2$ is a matching for $G_{I'}^\pi$ and $\mu'$ is a maximal weight matching for $G_{I'}^\pi$. If the inequality is strict, then

$$w(\mu - P_\mu^2 \cup P_{\mu'}^2 - \{\{i', d\}\} \cup \{\{i, d\}\}) > w(\mu)$$

which contradicts that $\mu$ is a maximal weight matching for $G_I^\pi$. Hence, both parts of the claim follow. □

*Claim* 5. $w'_c(P_\mu^1) \geq w'_c(P_{\mu'}^1)$.

Proof. We have

$$w'_c(P_\mu^1) = w_c(P_\mu^1) \geq w_c(P_{\mu'}^1) \geq w'_c(P_{\mu'}^1)$$

The first inequality follows from the fact that $\mu - P_\mu^1 \cup P_{\mu'}^1$ is a matching for $G_I^\pi$ and $\mu$ is a maximal weight matching for $G_I^\pi$. The remaining (in)equalities use the same arguments as in the sequence of (in)equalities in Claim 4. □

We conclude from the second part of Claim 4 and Claim 5 that $w'_c(P_\mu) \geq w'_c(P_{\mu'})$. So if $j_n \succ_\pi i$, then $w'(\mu' - P_{\mu'} \cup P_\mu) > w'(\mu')$, which contradicts that $\mu'$ is a maximal weight matching for $G^\pi_{I'}$. On the other hand, if $i \succ_\pi j_n$, then, by the first part of Claim 4, $w(\mu - P^2_\mu \cup P^2_{\mu'} - \{\{i', d\}\} \cup \{\{i, d\}\}) > w(\mu)$, which contradicts that $\mu$ is a maximal weight matching for $G^\pi_I$. Hence, it cannot be that $\mu(i) = \emptyset$ while $\mu'(i) \neq \emptyset$. □

Lemma 5.3. *Let $I = (N, C, (\succsim_c), (q_c))$ and $I' = (N, C, (\succsim_c), (q'_c))$ be two instances so that $q_c \leq q'_c$ for all $c \in C$. If $i \in N$ is matched in some maximal weight matching of $G^\pi_I$, then $i$ is matched in any maximal weight matching of $G^\pi_{I'}$.*

Proof. Let $\mu$ and $\mu'$ be maximal weight matchings of $G^\pi_I$ and $G^\pi_{I'}$, respectively. Assume that $\mu(i) = c \neq \emptyset$ and $\mu'(i) = \emptyset$. We derive a contradiction by constructing an augmenting path for either $\mu$ in $G^\pi_I$ or $\mu'$ in $G^\pi_{I'}$. We will use without further mention that $G^\pi_I$ and $G^\pi_{I'}$ have the same set of vertices and edges and the same weight function. Moreover, since $q_c \leq q'_c$ for all $c$, every matching of $G^\pi_I$ is also a matching of $G^\pi_{I'}$.

Let $\mathcal{P}$ be the set of all paths in $G^\pi_I$ that alternate between edges in $\mu$ and $\mu'$ and contain the edge $\{i, \mu(i)\} \in \mu - \mu'$. Note that $\mathcal{P}$ is non-empty since $\{\{i, \mu(i)\}\} \in \mathcal{P}$. Let $P = P_\mu \cup P_{\mu'}$ be of maximal length among all paths in $\mathcal{P}$.

$P_\mu$ and $P_{\mu'}$ are matchings of $G^\pi_{I'}$ that do not match the same set of agents. Hence, by the proof of Lemma 5.1(4), $w(P_\mu) \neq w(P_{\mu'})$. If $w(P_\mu) > w(P_{\mu'})$, then $P$ is an augmenting path for $\mu'$ in $G^\pi_{I'}$. Since $i$ is unmatched in $\mu'$ and $P$ has maximal length, $\mu' - P_{\mu'} \cup P_\mu$ is a matching of $G^\pi_{I'}$. The weight of this matching is larger than that of $\mu'$, contradicting that $\mu'$ has maximal weight. Similarly, if $w(P_\mu) < w(P_{\mu'})$, then $|P_{\mu'}| \geq |P_\mu|$, so that the initial vertex of $P$ is $i$ and the terminal vertex is an agent $j \in N$ that is unmatched in $\mu$. Hence, $\mu - P_\mu \cup P_{\mu'}$ is a matching of $G^\pi_I$, which has larger weight than $\mu$, a contradiction. □

We summarize the conclusions of Lemmas 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 in the following theorem.

Theorem 5.4. *Any allocation rule that chooses a maximal weight matching of $G^\pi_I$ for every instance $I$*

*(1) complies with acceptability requirements,*
*(2) is of maximum size among feasible matchings,*
*(3) respects priorities,*
*(4) is strategyproof if priorities are strict, and*
*(5) is monotonic in quotas.*

## 6 COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS

In this section, we discuss the computational complexity of finding maximal weight matchings. We show that a maximal weight matching of $G^\pi_I$ can be computed in strongly polynomial-time. Hence, an allocation rule that chooses maximal weight matchings can be implemented efficiently. The polynomial-time guarantee follows from the fact that a maximum weight $b$-matching with upper capacities on the nodes can be computed in strongly polynomial time even if edge weights are rational [42, Theorem 32.5].




**Figure 4: The modified reservation graph $G_I$ for the instance $I$ in Example 3.5. The dotted lines correspond to edges in $E$. The numbers close to the edges are their weights according to $w$.**

*Reduction from b-matchings to matchings.* One can avoid having to compute a maximal weight $b$-matching and use a standard algorithm for finding maximal weight matchings. We can expand $G^\pi_I$ by cloning each vertex $c \in C$ exactly $q_c$ times. Cloning means replacing the vertex by several vertices with the same neighbors and weights on the adjacent edges. In the expanded graph, we have a vertex for each of the units reserved for a category rather than a single vertex for each category. We can compute a maximal weight matching of the expanded graph using the Hungarian Algorithm [see, e.g., 34] for bipartite graphs, which runs in polynomial-time. It is straightforward to see that a maximal weight matching of the expanded graph corresponds in the obvious way to a maximal weight $b$-matching in the original reservation graph.

*Avoiding high-precision weights.* Although maximal weight matchings of the reservation graph can be computed in strongly polynomial-time, our approach requires using weights of high precision (the space requirement is still $|C|n \log n$ bits) because of the exponentially small weights of the weight function $w_\pi$. To avoid these high-precision weights, we provide an alternative polynomial-time algorithm that gives the same outcome. It iteratively computes maximum weight $b$-matchings of at most $n$ graphs. These graphs are the same as the reservation graph $G^\pi_I$ except that the weights $w_\pi$ awarded based on the baseline ordering are omitted.

More precisely, for a given instance $I$, the corresponding *modified* reservation graph $G_I = (N \cup C, E, w, (q_c))$ has the same set of vertices and edges and the same quotas as the reservation graph $G^\pi_I$. We weight of an edge $\{i, c\} \in E$ is

$$w(\{i, c\}) = 1 + w_c(\{i, c\})$$

where $w_c$ is defined as in Section 5. The modified reservation graph for the instance in Example 3.5 is depicted in Figure 4.

To state our algorithm, we also define a graph $H^{N'}_I$ that is parametrized by a subset of agents $N'$. It is identical to $G_I$ except that for each $i \in N'$ and each $c$ with $i \succ_c \emptyset$, $w_i(c) = 2n + 1$.

The algorithm is specified in pseudo-code Algorithm 1. The main idea of the algorithm is to work on the graph $G_I$ and iteratively go through the agents in the baseline ordering and build the working set of selected agents $N^*$. The set of agents in $N^*$ can all be matched in some maximum weight matching of $G_I$. For the new agent $i$ under consideration, we check whether $i$ can be matched in a maximum weight matching of $G_I$ that also matches the agents currently in $N^*$. This is checked by modifying the weights of $G_I$ to consider the graph $H_I^{N^*\cup\{i\}}$. The graph $H_I^{N^*\cup\{i\}}$ is the same as graph $G_I$ except that a large weight of $2n$ is added to the edges adjacent to agents in $N^* \cup \{i\}$. This ensures that there is a maximum weight matching in $G_I$ that matches the agents in $N^* \cup \{i\}$ if and only if the maximum weight matching of $H_I^{N^*\cup\{i\}}$ has weight $mw(H_I^{N^*\cup\{i\}}) = mw(G_I)+2n(|N^*|+1)$, where $mw(G)$ is the weight of a maximum weight matching in a graph $G$.

**Input:** $I = (N, C, (\succsim_c), (q_c))$; a baseline ordering $\pi$ over agents in $N$
**Output:** A matching of $G_I$.

Construct the modified reservation graph $G_I$.
Compute the weight $mw(G_I)$ of a maximum weight matching of $G_I$.
Selected set of agents $N^* \leftarrow \emptyset$
**for** agent $i \notin N^*$ down the ordering $\pi$ **do**
  Consider graph $H_I^{N^*\cup\{i\}}$ that is identical to $G_I$ except that for all $j \in N$ and $c \in C$,

$$w(\{j,c\}) = \begin{cases} 1 + 2n + w_c(\{j,c\}) & \text{if } j \in N^* \cup \{i\} \\ 1 + w_c(\{j,c\}) & \text{if } j \notin N^* \cup \{i\} \end{cases}$$

  **if** $mw(H_I^{N^*\cup\{i\}}) = mw(G_I) + 2n(|N^*| + 1)$ **then**
    Add $i$ to $N^*$
Compute a maximum weight b-matching $\mu$ of $H_I^{N^*}$.
**return** $\mu$

**Algorithm 1**

*Example 6.1 (Illustration of Algorithm 1).* Suppose the baseline ordering is $\pi = 123$. In that case the algorithm first computes $G_I$ as shown in Figure 2. The maximum weight matching of the graph is $\{\{3, c_1\}, \{2, c_2\}\}$. It is the unique maximum weight matching. Therefore, we are unable to add agent 1 to $N^*$. We then check 2 and 3 which are able to be added to $N^*$.

## 7 DISCUSSION

We presented an allocation rule that applies to resource allocation problems in which the resources are reserved for categories, each of which has a priority ranking over agents. The rule has several properties that are desirable in applications. It is fair in the sense that it complies with the acceptability requirements and respects the priorities, it is efficient in that it yields maximum size matchings, and it never incentivizes agents to under-report which categories they are eligible for. Furthermore, weakly increasing quotas does not harm the agents who get a unit.

We can reframe the main theorem in the context of school choice [1] by viewing agents as students and categories as schools. The students are indifferent between all schools that are acceptable for them. The schools have priorities over the students. Then Theorem 5.4 reads as follows.

Theorem 7.1. *Consider the school choice problem where the students partition the schools into acceptable and unacceptable schools. Then, there is an allocation rule that only matches students to acceptable schools, has not justified envy, is non-wasteful, and matches the maximal feasible number of students. Moreover, if the schools' preferences are strict, the rule is strategyproof for students.*

Our allocation rule involves a baseline ordering $\pi$ over the agents, which gives rise to a natural ordering in which patients are allocated units. We can go down the ordering $\pi$ and give a unit to the agent that was matched by the allocation rule.

Our rule focusses on giving units to categories that correspond to preferential groups such as front-line workers. If some units are not utilized because of eligibility requirements, they can be given to the unmatched agents. In this case, the reservations are viewed as soft. Policy makers may wish to use a certain number of 'unreserved' units [38] to general agents who do not fall into any priority groups. This requirement can easily be embedded into our rule as follows. Once we have used our rule to match agents to preferential categories, we can greedily give the unreserved units to the unmatched agents in the order of the baseline ordering. We refer to this version of our rule as the *weighted reservation graph (WRG)* rule.

We assumed that the categories and their capacities are primitives of the model. A separate research problem is to decide on the distribution of the units over the categories with the aim to reduce the pandemic for the society. Finally, it will be useful to consider a more fine-grained model that allows quantifying how much a patient needs a unit.

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